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We consider the following optimal mechanism design problem in single machine scheduling.
Given are n jobs which we regard as selfish agents. Jobs need to be processed non-preemptively
on a single machine. Each job j has processing time pj and a disutility wj for waiting one unit
of time. This defines the 2-dimensional type tj = (wj , pj) of a job j.
The allocation rule f is a mapping of type profiles t = (tj)j=1,...,n to the set of all n! sched-
ules. If in a given schedule σ, Sj(σ) denotes the starting time of job j, the jobs valuation for
that schedule is −wjSj(σ). We assume that the mechanism designer needs to compensate jobs
for waiting in the form of a payment pij , such that pij−wjSj ≥ 0. We consider this problem in a
Bayes-Nash setting, that is, given are publicly known, discrete probability distributions describ-
ing the jobs’ possible types. Our goal is to find a (Bayes-Nash) incentive compatible mechanism
that is optimal, which is a mechanism that minimizes the total expected payment
∑
j Epij .
This Problem has been considered earlier in a paper by Heydenreich et al. [3], where mainly
the special case of 1-dimensional type spaces has been analyzed (that is, public processing
times pj and private wj). Also in that paper, an example has been proposed to show that
optimal mechanisms in the 2-dimensional case in general do not satisfy a condition called IIA,
independence of irrelevant alternatives 1. However, that example was flawed.
Mixed Integer Programming Approach and Results
Motivated by the questions left open in [3], we were interested in getting more insight into
properties of (optimal) mechanisms for the 2-dimensional case. In particular, in search for
succinct characterizations of optimal mechanisms, at least for special cases, IIA is about the
minimal property that such a mechanism should have. In other words, if (optimal) mechanisms
are not IIA, this gives a hint towards intractability of the optimal mechanism design problem.
Hence our particular interest in the IIA condition.
Moreover, it can been shown that for the 1-dimensional problem, Bayes-Nash incentive com-
patibility (BIC) and Dominant Strategy incentive compatibility (DIC) is equivalent in the sense
that any mechanism that is BIC implementable, is also DIC implementable with the same ex-
pected total payment [?]. Such a result is also known for the single-object auction setting; see
Manelli and Vincent [7]. However, Gerskhov et al. [6] show that such a result can only be valid
in restrictive environments, as in general, BIC and DIC implementability are not equivalent as
soon as there are at least three possible outcomes. Therefore, we are also interested in analysing
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1An allocation rule f satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives if the relative order of any two jobs j1
and j2 is the same in the schedules f(t
1) and f(t2) for any two type profiles t1, t2 that differ only in the types of
agents other than j1 and j2.
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both BIC and DIC implementability in the 2-dimensional mechanism design problem for the
specific scheduling problem considered here.
This is the context of our work, and our contribution is as follows. In the flavour of recent
work on automated mechanism design as proposed by Conitzer and Sandholm, see [1, 5], we
formulate the optimal mechanism design problem for this scheduling application as Mixed In-
teger Linear Programming Problem (MIP). Here, the payment scheme gives rise to continuous
variables pij ≥ 0, and the allocation rule f gives rise to 0-1-variables as follows.
ft,σ =
{
1 type profile t is assigned schedule σ
0 otherwise
Using these variables, individual rationality and (Bayes-Nash) incentive compatibility can eas-
ily be written as linear constraints. What is particularly charming about this formulation is
that we can express the IIA condition as a quadratic constraint, which can be linearised using
standard methods. Moreover, the formulation is universal enough to be used for both Bayes-
Nash and Dominant Strategy incentive compatibility. Concerning the optimal mechanism for
the mentioned 2-dimensional scheduling application we have found the following.
Theorem 1 For the 2-dimensional optimal mechanism design problem as sketched above
(i) the optimal mechanism for the Bayes-Nash setting does in general not satisfy the IIA
condition
(ii) Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility and Dominant Strategy incentive compatibility are not
equivalent
Both results are in fact obtained with minimal instances consisting of only 3 jobs. This is
minimal as for instances with 2 jobs, (i) all mechanisms are trivially IIA, and (ii) Bayes-Nash
incentive compatibility and Dominant Strategy incentive compatibility are equivalent, as there
are only 2 possible outcomes [6]. Also note that, regarding (i), for the 1-dimensional problem
the optimal mechanism is a modification of Smith’s rule which clearly does satisfy the IIA
condition. Finally, regarding (ii), the 1-dimensional problem does have the property that BIC
and DIC are equivalent [4]. The counterexamples for the 2-dimensional case have been found
by generating instances systematically at random, and computing optimal mechanisms (with
or without enforcing IIA, Bayes-Nash and Dominant Strategy incentive compatible) for each of
them.
Current and Future Work
Although our MIP formulation is too large to be used for solving real-world instances, we are
able to solve problems with up to 4 jobs in a matter of seconds. Hence, the MIP approach serves
well in testing and generating hypotheses. One such hypothesis, which is currently backed by
empirical evidence but lacks a formal proof is the following.
Conjecture 2 For the 2-dimensional optimal mechanism design problem as sketched above
where the types of jobs are generated by a product distribution rather than an arbitrary dis-
tribution, the optimal mechanism for the Bayes-Nash setting satisfies the IIA condition.
Apart from proving this conjecture, further ambitions for future work are analyzing the rel-
ative degradation in costs comparing Bayes-Nash and Dominant Strategy implementations in
terms of a worst case analysis, doing the same for IIA implementations, as well as proving the
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2-dimensional optimal mechanism design problem for this specific scheduling problem as com-
putationally hard (a result that does not follow from [1]). Finally, enhancing the MIP approach
in order to make it computationally feasible is an obvious next step as well; see also [2]. To that
end, we are also experimenting with alternative MIP formulations.
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